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REFORMING CIVIL FORFEITURE LAW: THE
CASE FOR AN AUTOMATIC STAY
PROVISION
GARY R. BROWN*
INTRODUCTION
Driven primarily by the war on drugs, the federal government
has broadly expanded the use of civil forfeiture statutes in recent
years.' Since 1985, more than $2.7 billion has been forfeited to
the United States, and an additional $1.1 billion has been distrib-
uted to more than 3000 state and local law enforcement agencies
through the federal government's equitable sharing program.2
According to Department of Justice statistics, more than 5000
civil forfeiture actions were pending in federal district courts in
1993. 3
Despite certain criticism of the growth of civil forfeiture ac-
tions by courts, commentators, and the media,4 the trend towards
increased use of civil forfeiture actions is likely to continue. The
* B.A. 1985, Columbia College; J.D. 1988, Yale Law School; Assistant United
States Attorney in the Eastern District of New York. The opinions expressed herein
are solely those of the author and do not reflect the position of the United States or
any of its agencies.
1 United States v. All Funds on Deposit, 801 F. Supp. 984, 989 (E.D.N.Y. 1992)
("As the 'drug war' has escalated, the number of forfeiture cases in the United States
has burgeoned."), affd sub nom. United States v. Daccarett, 6 F.3d 37 (2d Cir. 1993).
2 Department of Justice press release, January 15, 1993; Cary H. Copeland, Seiz-
ing Assets: Effective Anti-Crime Tool, CHI. Tam., Apr. 1, 1992, at 22.
3 See Civil Caseload Statistics of Asset Forfeitures by District, Aug. 31, 1993.
4 See, e.g., United States v. James Daniel Good Real Property, 114 S. Ct. 492, 515
(1993) (Thomas, J., dissenting) (expressing "distrust of the Government's aggressive
use of broad civil forfeiture statutes"); United States v. Statewide Auto Parts, 971
F.2d 896, 905 (2d Cir. 1992); Onwubiko v. United States, 969 F.2d 1392 (2d Cir. 1992);
George C. Pratt & William B. Petersen, Civil Forfeiture in the Second Circuit, 65 ST.
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potential of civil forfeiture to raise revenue offers a strong incen-
tive to a deficit-laden government.5 Moreover, amendments to the
federal money laundering statutes have substantially broadened
the application of civil forfeiture to various financial crimes.
Through the incorporation of sections 1956 and 1957 into section
981 of title 18 of the United States Code, the government can
bring forfeiture proceedings to recover property involved in trans-
actions or attempted transactions related to a broad array of fi-
nancial crimes, including all of the RICO predicates. 6 The Annun-
zio-Wylie Anti-Money Laundering Act of 19921 added several new
domestic offenses to this list of forfeitable offenses, 8 included cer-
tain foreign offenses, 9 relaxed the "tracing" requirements imposed
on the government, 10 and expanded the jurisdictional and venue
provisions of section 981.11 Perhaps most significant was the en-
actment of title 18, section 984, which permits, for the first time,
civil forfeiture of substitute assets under certain conditions. 12 Fi-
JOHN'S L. REV. 653, 671-72 (1991); A.S. Hays, Civil Forfeiture Laws are Under Attack,
WALL ST. J., Jan. 14, 1993, at B8.
5 See James Daniel Good, 114 S. Ct. at 502 n.2; Caplin & Drysdale v. United
States, 491 U.S. 617, 629 (1989) ("[S]ums of money that can be raised for law enforce-
ment activities [through forfeiture] are substantial.., and the government's interest
in using the profits of crime to fund these activities should not be discounted."); State-
wide, 971 F.2d at 909 (Van Graafeiland, C.J., dissenting) (stating that raising reve-
nue to fund law enforcement activities is positive aspect of forfeiture); United States
v. 38 Whalers Cove Drive, 954 F.2d 29, 35-36 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 113 S. Ct. 55
(1992).
6 18 U.S.C. § 981(a)(1)(A) (1988). The following property is subject to forfeiture to
the United States: "Any property, real or personal, involved in a transaction or at-
tempted transaction in violation of section 5313(a) or 5324(a) of title 31, or of section
1956 or 1957 of this title, or any property traceable to such property." Id. Section 1956
prohibits participation in a transaction involving the proceeds of "specified unlawful
activity." Id. § 1956(a). The predicate "unlawful activity" encompasses, inter alia,
RICO offenses, id. § 1956(c)(7)(A), as well as various financial crimes. Id.
§ 1956(c)(7)(D) (including fraudulent bank entries, fraudulent Federal Deposit Insur-
ance transactions, fraudulent loan applications, etc.).
7 Pub. L. No. 102-550, 106 Stat. 4056 (1992).
8 Id. § 1534 (amending 18 U.S.C. § 1956(c)(7)(D)).
9 Id. § 1536 (amending 18 U.S.C. § 1956(c)(7)(B)).
10 Id. § 1522 (to be codified at 18 U.S.C. § 984); see infra note 12 and accom,ny-
ing text (discussing forfeiture of substitute assets).
11 Pub. L. No. 102-550, § 1521, 106 Stat. 4044, 4062 (amending 28 U.S.C. § 1355).
12 See Amy G. Rudnick & James M. Schwarz, Banks Must Gear Up for Compre-
hensive New Money Laundering Law, 11 BANKNG POL'Y REP. 1 (1992), available in
WESTLAW, PH-BNKPR Database.
The law contains a significant new civil forfeiture section that permits the
government to seize and forfeit identical or "substitute" assets in cases in-
volving fungible property. This new provision (18 U.S.C. § 984) is intended
to ease the government's tracing requirements in civil forfeiture cases in-
CIVIL FORFEITURE
nally, abandoning traditional limitations on a court's forfeiture
authority, Congress expanded the in rem jurisdiction of the dis-
trict courts to encompass property located anywhere in the
world. 13
Thus, any comprehensive reform of federal civil litigation
must address civil forfeiture actions, which constitute one of the
fastest growing segments of the federal dockets. This Article ana-
lyzes one provision by which to reduce the burden caused by civil
forfeiture actions: the imposition of an automatic stay of such ac-
tions pending the resolution of related or parallel criminal pro-
ceedings. As discussed below, an automatic stay provision would
conserve judicial resources; safeguard criminal investigations,
prosecutions, and grand jury proceedings; and protect the Fifth
Amendment rights of claimants in civil forfeiture proceedings.
I. CURRENT PROVISIONS FOR STAYING CIL FORFEITURE
ACTIONS
Under current law, the government must move for a stay and
must carry the burden of justifying its imposition. Section 981(g)
of title 18 of the United States Code provides: "The filing of an
indictment or information alleging a violation of law, Federal,
State or local, which is also related to a forfeiture proceeding
under this section shall, upon motion of the United States and for
good cause shown, stay the forfeiture proceeding."' 4 Section 881
of title 21, the civil forfeiture section governing actions based on
narcotics violations, contains virtually identical language.1 5
Based on the showing of good cause required by these sections,
courts have imposed varying burdens upon the government in con-
sidering whether to grant a stay. For example, a number of courts
have analogized the motion for a stay to an application for a pre-
liminary injunction, and have thus held that the government must
demonstrate:
volving the laundering of cash, monetary instruments in bearer form, fumds
deposited in bank accounts and other fimgible property. The forfeiture of
substitute assets has been permitted in criminal money laundering cases
since 1988.
Id. For examples of criminal substitute assets forfeiture provisions, see 18 U.S.C.
§ 1963(m) (1988) (RICO); 21 U.S.C. § 853(p) (1988) (drug enforcement).
13 See 28 U.S.C. § 1355(b).
14 18 U.S.C. § 981(g) (1988).
15 See 21 U.S.C. § 881(i) (1988).
1993]
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(1) a substantial likelihood that plaintiff will prevail on the mer-
its, (2) a substantial threat that plaintiff will suffer irreparable
injury if the [stay] is not granted, (3) that the threatened injury
to plaintiff outweighs the threatened harm the [stay] may do to
[the claimant], (4) that granting the [stay] will not disserve the
public interest.
1 6
Other courts have stated that "the government should at least be
required to make a specific showing of the harm it will suffer with-
out a stay and why other methods of protecting its interests are
insufficient."' 7 Furthermore, courts have held that the potential
abuse of civil discovery does not justify a stay under these provi-
sions. Rather, a motion for a stay must be made in response to
abusive discovery requests.' Courts have also grappled with the
issue of whether the parallel criminal case is sufficiently related
to the civil forfeiture action to justify a stay.19
These statutory provisions were intended to facilitate the is-
suance of stays. In enacting these sections, "Congress anticipated
that compelling discovery in the context of a civil forfeiture pro-
ceeding might force the Government to prematurely disclose infor-
mation in the related criminal proceeding that it would not other-
wise have to do."2" Thus, it was the intent of Congress that these
sections would protect the government by facilitating the entry of
stays in civil forfeiture cases.2 '
16 See, e.g., Canal Auth. v. Calloway, 489 F.2d 567, 572 (5th Cir. 1974); United
States v. 5137/5139 Cent. Ave., 776 F. Supp. 1090, 1092 (W.D.N.C. 1991); United
States v. $151,388.00 in United States Currency, 751 F. Supp. 547 (E.D.N.C. 1990);
United States v. 12525 Palm Rd., 731 F. Supp. 1057, 1060 (S.D. Fla. 1990); United
States v. 1303 Whitehead St., 729 F. Supp. 98, 100 (S.D. Fla. 1990).
17 In re Ramu Corp., 903 F.2d 312, 320 (5th Cir. 1990); accord United States v.
118 Ave. D, 754 F. Supp. 282, 287 (E.D.N.Y. 1990).
18 Ramu, 903 F.2d at 318; United States v. All Funds on Deposit, 767 F. Supp. 36
(E.D.N.Y. 1991) (denying stay); 118 Ave. D, 754 F. Supp. at 282. But see United States
v. 297 Hawley St., 727 F. Supp. 90, 91 (W.D.N.Y. 1990) (granting stay based on poten-
tial for abuse of civil discovery).
19 See, e.g., United States v. Funds Held in Name of John Hugh Wetterer, 138
F.R.D. 356 (E.D.N.Y. 1991) (holding that interests of corporate claimant and indicted
director sufficiently aligned to justify stay); 118 Ave. D, 754 F. Supp. at 289
("[Cionsiderations supporting a stay remain the same where the non-defendant]
claimant is a relative or associate of the criminal defendant.").
20 118 Ave. D, 754 F. Supp. at 285-86 (citing S. REP. No. 225, 98th Cong., 2d Sess.
215, reprinted in 1984 U.S.C.C.A.N. 3182, 3398-99) (Section 881(i) "provides for a stay
of civil forfeiture proceedings when the government has commenced a criminal case
that involves issues the same as or related to those on which the forfeiture action is
based").
21 See 297 Hawley St., 727 F. Supp. at 91-92.
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Ironically, the Fifth Circuit has held that rather than ex-
panding the circumstances under which a stay could be granted,
section 881(i) of title 21 has "explicitly circumscribed" the "inher-
ent discretion of the trial court to control the course of litiga-
tion."22 In the absence of this provision, the Fifth Circuit rea-
soned, a court has the discretion to enter a stay "in control of its
docket and in the interest of justice."23 The court found that,
"before granting a stay under 21 U.S.C. § 881(i), a district court
must make express findings of fact and conclusions of law con-
cerning the existence of the statutory prerequisites for a stay,"
namely relatedness and good cause.24 Therefore, according to the
Fifth Circuit, the application of the "stay" provisions is inconsis-
tent with the legislative purpose of facilitating the entry of a stay
in civil forfeiture actions.
Both title 18, section 981(g) and title 21, section 881(i) require
the filing of an indictment or information as a predicate to staying
civil forfeiture proceedings.2 5 Absent an indictment or informa-
tion, a stay of discovery may be obtained in the form of a protec-
tive order pursuant to Rule 26 of the Federal Rules of Civil Proce-
dure. 6 Courts have long recognized that when criminal and civil
proceedings arise from the same set of facts, the government is
generally entitled to a protective order against civil discovery
pending resolution of the criminal action. 7 However, to obtain a
stay under Rule 26, the government must make the same "good
cause" showing required by the statutory provisions. 8 Moreover,
under certain circumstances, a stay of discovery, unlike the stay of
proceedings provided by the statutory sections, is insufficient to
protect the government's interests. For example, to adequately
defend against a summary judgment motion, the government may
be required to disclose information which could compromise an
ongoing investigation or pending prosecution. 29 Similarly, a mo-
22 Ramu, 903 F.2d at 318-19.
23 Id. at 318 (quoting McKnight v. Blanchard, 667 F.2d 477, 479 (5th Cir. 1982)).
24 Id. at 319 (remanding matter to district court for determination of relatedness
and good cause).
25 See supra notes 15-16 and accompanying text (setting forth language of stay
provisions).
26 FED. R. Civ. P. 26(c).
27 See United States v. 1964 Cadillac Coupe DeVille, 41 F.R.D. 352, 353 (S.D.N.Y.
1966).
28 United States v. 12525 Palm Rd., 731 F. Supp. 1037, 1059 (S.D. Fla. 1990).
29 See Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 324 (1986) (finding that party op-
posing summary judgment must come forward with its case).
1993]
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tion to stay pending civil forfeiture proceedings requires the dis-
closure of sensitive information. °
II. BENEFITS OF AN AUToMATIc STAY PROVISION
Revising the current framework to provide for an automatic
stay would result in increased judicial efficiency and offer protec-
tion to the government, as well as to civil forfeiture claimants.
The benefits offered to litigants by such a revision would, in the
long run, exceed the perceived tactical advantages of the present
system.31
A. Judicial Economy
In terms of judicial economy, an automatic stay provision
would facilitate the resolution of civil forfeiture actions in two
ways. First, an automatic stay would eliminate the burdensome
motion practice associated with obtaining a stay, which frequently
occurs in civil forfeiture actions. Although many courts currently
apply a preliminary injunction-like standard in determining
whether to grant a stay, they have struggled with the concepts of
good cause and relatedness under the relevant statutory provi-
sions. The introduction of an automatic stay of civil forfeiture ac-
tions would eliminate the need for these nettlesome
determinations.
Second, and perhaps more importantly, staying civil forfei-
ture proceedings pending the outcome of parallel criminal pro-
ceedings will substantially reduce the judicial resources required
to ultimately resolve the merits of the forfeiture cases. Under ex-
isting law, verdicts rendered in criminal proceedings have a collat-
eral estoppel effect on parallel civil forfeiture proceedings. 32 A
similar effect is attributed to guilty pleas entered in criminal pro-
ceedings. 3 3 A conviction in a state criminal proceeding has a
30 See, e.g., 12525 Palm Road, 731 F. Supp. at 1060 (authorizing in camera review
of materials in support of motion to stay).
31 See REPORT TO THE HOUSE OF DELEGATES 108B, 4 (A.B.A. Criminal Justice Sec-
tion 1993) ("Inevitably, in parallel proceedings, both sides are tempted to utilize civil
discovery as a means of circumventing the limitations imposed under the criminal
discovery rules.") [hereinafter ABA Report].
32 United States v. 127.814 Acres of Land, 941 F.2d 1210 (6th Cir. 1991); United
States v. $80,080.00 in United States Currency, 779 F. Supp. 169 (N.D. Ga. 1991).
33 United States v. 10652 South Laramie, 774 F. Supp. 518 (N.D. Mll. 1991). But
see United States v. Via and One 1982 Cadillac Eldorado, 9 F.3d 1545 (4th Cir. 1992).
[Vol. 67:705
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preclusive effect on federal civil forfeiture proceedings. 3 4 While
collateral estoppel generally applies only to the individuals sub-
ject to the conviction, it may, under certain circumstances, bar the
claims of claimants other than the criminal defendant. 5 Thus,
awaiting the outcome of parallel criminal proceedings will, in
many cases, serve to resolve the underlying merits of civil forfei-
ture actions, making such actions subject to summary judgment or
rapid settlement. Even in those cases in which a trial is still re-
quired, the collateral effect of parallel criminal cases may substan-
tially reduce the issues to be tried. Conversely, although an aquit-
tal in a criminal case does not have a preclusive effect on parallel
civil forfeiture actions,36 an acquittal may reveal potential weak-
nesses in the government's case, possibly leading to a voluntary
dismissal or settlement. Although "Congress seems to have in-
tended that the civil and criminal proceedings advance along par-
allel tracks with neither one slowing or inhibiting the other,"
37
considerations of judicial economy suggest that this policy be care-
flly reconsidered.
B. Benefits to the Government
It is well established that the government has an interest in
protecting criminal prosecutions from civil discovery. In contrast
to the broad scope of discovery permitted under the Federal Rules
of Civil Procedure, the discovery available to a criminal defendant
is narrowly circumscribed. For example, title 18, section 3500
"does away with any pre-trial discovery of statements of a govern-
ment witness" in a criminal trial.3 8 Courts have expressed con-
cern that information obtained by or on behalf of criminal defend-
ants in civil discovery could result in perjury or manufactured
34 United States v. 303 W. 116th St., 901 F.2d 288 (2d Cir. 1990); United States v.
200 Pennsylvania Ave., 786 F. Supp. 400 (D. Del. 1992); United States v. 16 Sequoia,
764 F. Supp 1285 (N.D. IlM. 1991); United States v. 250 Kreag Rd., 739 F. Supp. 120
(W.D.N.Y. 1990).
35 See, e.g., United States v. 1984 Jaguar XJ16, No. 90-28-ALB (M.D. Ga. Oct. 31,
1991); cf. United States v. Accounts Nos. 3034504054 and 144-07-143, 971 F.2d 974,
985-87 (3d Cir. 1992) (striking claim of corporate claimants based on fugitive status of
principal).
36 United States v. Assortment of 89 Firearms, 465 U.S. 354, 359 (1984). '"at
acquittal on a criminal charge is not a bar to a civil action by the Government, reme-
dial in its nature, arising out of the same facts on which the criminal proceeding was
based has long been settled." Id. (citation omitted).
37 United States v. 121 Nostrand Ave., 760 F. Supp. 1015, 1020 (E.D.N.Y. 1991).
38 Campbell v. Eastland, 307 F.2d 478, 487 (5th Cir. 1962), cert. denied, 371 U.S.
955 (1963).
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evidence, intimidation of government witnesses, and unfair sur-
prise to the prosecution, 39 while invocation of the Fifth Amend-
ment could effectively thwart any attempt by the government to
obtain relevant evidence. 40
In addition, the government has a substantial interest in se-
curing the secrecy of criminal investigations and grand jury pro-
ceedings. In fact, it can be argued that there is a greater risk of
compromising a criminal prosecution at the investigative stage
than after an indictment or information has been filed.41 An auto-
matic stay would protect the public interest in safeguarding crimi-
nal investigations and proceedings, and would avoid the unneces-
sary disclosure of sensitive law enforcement information.
In light of expanding application of constitutional protections
to civil forfeiture claimants which transcend the boundaries of the
civil proceeding, a stay of civil forfeiture actions may also serve to
protect the viability of certain criminal prosecutions. For exam-
39 United States v. Hugo Key & Son, Inc., 672 F. Supp. 656, 658 (D.R.I. 1987). As
the Hugo court noted, the
liberal discovery rules [of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure] would expose
the strategy of the prosecution and possibly result in defendant's perjury
and manufacturing of evidence .... Moreover, it cannot be doubted that the
discovery of the identity of confidential government informants would pro-
vide an opportunity for the intimidation of prospective witnesses .... Fi-
nally, the liberal discovery policies of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure,
while permitting defendant broad scope would not be available to the gov-
ernment... because defendant could... assert his privilege against self-
incrimination. This procedural asymmetry would offer the defendant the op-
portunity to surprise the prosecution at trial while withholding that same
opportunity from the prosecution.
Id.; see Britt v. North Carolina, 404 U.S. 226, 238 (1971) (Douglas, J., dissenting)
(discussing effects of discovery in criminal proceedings); United States v. LBS Bank-
New York, 757 F. Supp. 496, 507 (E.D. Pa. 1990) (discussing danger of discovery in
criminal proceedings); United States v. Persico, 621 F. Supp. 842, 868 (S.D.N.Y. 1985)
(same); United States v. Smith, 209 F. Supp. 907, 911 (E.D. IlM. 1962) (same).
40 Hugo Key & Son, 672 F. Supp. at 658; Founding Church of Scientology v. Kel-
ley, 77 F.R.D. 378, 381 (D.D.C. 1977) (citing Campbell, 307 F.2d at 487 n.12); see
United States v. Mellon Bank N.A., 545 F.2d 869, 870 (3d Cir. 1976) (stating that
intervenor obtained stay of civil action because it may have jeopardized Fifth Amend-
ment rights); Gordon v. FDIC, 427 F.2d 578, 580 (D.C. Cir. 1970) (stating that courts
properly issue protective orders preventing discovery that would violate privilege
against self-incrimination).
41 Integrated Generics, Inc. v. Bowen, 678 F. Supp. 1004, 1009 (E.D.N.Y. 1988)
(granting stay to "ensur[e] the integrity of grand jury proceedings"); Founding
Church, 77 F.R.D. at 380 n.4 ("[T]he policies that necessitate limiting civil discovery
when it would interfere with a criminal investigation . . . are equally applicable
whether the plaintiff seeking discovery is a defendant or merely the subject of a grand
jury investigation."); SEC v. Control Metals Corp., 57 F.R.D. 56 (S.D.N.Y. 1972)
(granting stay of discovery pending completion of grand jury proceedings).
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ple, courts have held that, at least under certain circumstances,
civil forfeiture actions are subject to the Double Jeopardy Clause
of the Fifth Amendment.42 Thus, while resolution of a, criminal
action generally preceded that of related civil actions, the govern-
ment is faced with the possibility that a successful civil forfeiture
could preclude a related prosecution.43 Similarly, the Supreme
Court's application of the Eighth Amendment's Excessive Fines
Clause to civil forfeiture could complicate prosecution or sentenc-
ing in a post-forfeiture criminal action.4 Thus, an automatic stay
of civil forfeiture proceedings furthers the government's interest
in ensuring the imposition of appropriate criminal sanctions.
C. Benefits to the Claimant
Under the current framework, a stay is generally available
only on the government's motion. Motions by claimants to stay
civil forfeiture actions have generally been denied.4 5 In respond-
ing to civil discovery, claimants are, of course, free to invoke the
Fifth Amendment. 46 The problem confronting claimants, how-
ever, is that invocation of the Fifth Amendment results in a nega-
tive inference in the civil forfeiture proceeding,47 and potentially,
forfeiture of their property.
42 United States v. 38 Whalers Cove Drive, 954 F.2d at 29, 34 (2d Cir. 1991) (cit-
ing United States v. Halper, 490 U.S. 435 (1989)); cf United States v. United States
Currency in the Amount of $145,139.00, Nos. 965, 92-6252, 1994 WL 56504 (2d Cir.
1994).
43 See United States v. Amiel, 995 F.2d 367 (2d Cir. 1993).
44 See Austin v. United States, 113 S. Ct. 2901 (1993).
45 See United States v. 121 Nostrand Ave., 760 F. Supp. 1015, 1034 (E.D.N.Y.
1991) (noting that court initially denied stay); United States v. 218 Panther St., 745
F. Supp. 118, 119 (E.D.N.Y. 1990) (denying stay because claimant lacked standing),
aff d, 951 F.2d 461 (2d Cir. 1991); cf United States v. 6250 Ledge Rd., 943 F.2d 721,
730 (7th Cir. 1991) (holding that claimant must precisely indicate prejudice resulting
from civil action to obtain stay).
46 See, e.g., Pillsbury v. Conboy, 459 U.S. 248, 264 n.24 (1983) (holding that dis-
trict courts are precluded from "compelling testimony in a civil deposition over a valid
assertion of the Fifth Amendment privilege, absent a specific assurance of immunity
for such testimony"); Kastigar v. United States, 406 U.S. 441, 444-45 (1972) (holding
that Fifth Amendment is most important exception to testimonial duty).
47 Baxter v. Palmigiano, 425 U.S. 308, 318 (1976). Generally, "the Fifth Amend-
ment does not forbid adverse inferences against parties to civil actions when they
refuse to testify in response to probative evidence offered against them." Id.; accord
United States v. 15 Black Ledge Drive, 897 F.2d 97, 103 (2d Cir. 1990).
Negative inferences have been used in civil forfeiture cases. United States v. 900
Rio Vista Blvd., 803 F.2d 625, 627 n.4 (11th Cir. 1986); see Avirgan v. Hull, 932 F.2d
1572, 1580 (11th Cir. 1991) (holding that negative inference does not substitute for
evidence needed to meet burden of production), cert. denied, 112 S. Ct. 913 (1992).
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Accordingly, a growing number of courts have recognized that
the protection of claimants' Fifth Amendment rights warrants a
stay of civil forfeiture proceedings; for example, one court, while
noting that there is no constitutional right to a stay, determined
that courts retain discretion to stay civil forfeiture proceedings to
spare claimants from making a "Hobson's choice."4 ' The Second
Circuit, although not deciding the issue, stated that "[t]he permis-
sibility of an adverse inference from a claim of Fifth Amendment
privilege in a civil forfeiture proceeding involving a home, espe-
cially during the pendency of parallel criminal charges, poses a
troubling question, given the severity of the deprivation at risk."49
More recently, the Second Circuit has, in dicta, urged district
courts to "stay civil forfeiture proceedings pending the completion
of related criminal proceedings."50
Thus, the imposition of an automatic stay would protect
claimants from ceding one constitutional right in order to assert
another.51 This would, in turn, deny the government the tactical
benefit of compelling claimants to respond to civil discovery re-
quests during the pendency of parallel criminal proceedings. 52 It
can be argued that a stay under these circumstances would ulti-
mately encourage pejury by claimants. As noted above, however,
imposing an automatic stay would allow the government to file
civil forfeiture proceedings without jeopardizing criminal investi-
48 United States v. 1344 Ridge Rd., 751 F. Supp. 1060, 1061-62 (E.D.N.Y. 1989).
49 15 Black Ledge Drive, 897 F.2d at 103 (citation omitted).
50 United States v. Statewide Auto Parts, 971 F.2d 896, 905 (2d Cir. 1992) (rec-
ommending that district courts exercise discretion "absent some sort of extraordinary
situation").
51 See United States v. United States Currency, 626 F.2d 11, 17 (6th Cir.) (vacat-
ing district court's order dismissing forfeiture proceedings), cert. denied, 449 U.S. 993
(1980). The court recognized that claimants should not be compelled to choose be-
tween the exercise of their Fifth Amendment privilege and property subject to a forfei-
ture proceeding. Id. at 15. Conversely, the government should not be compelled to
forego the forfeiture remedy authorized by Congress in its enactment of 18 U.S.C.
§ 981. Id. The court noted that there were several devices available to prevent the
collision of these rights, including a stay of the forfeiture proceeding. Id. at 17 ("The
court might also choose to stay the forfeiture proceedings until the completion of any
criminal prosecutions.. . ."); see 1344 Ridge Rd., 751 F. Supp. at 1062 n.1 (citing cases
holding unconstitutional compulsory choice between two constitutional rights).
52 See FED. R. CIv. P. Supp. Rule C(6) (requiring claimants to respond to govern-
ment interrogatories at time of answering complaint). Due to the absence in civil for-
feiture proceedings of the protections afforded criminal defendants, including court-
approved discovery and a high burden of proof, one court has expressed concern that
"the forfeiture statute is being used... as a substitute-or perhaps as a dry run-for
a criminal prosecution." Statewide, 971 F.2d at 903.
[Vol. 67:705714
CIVIL FORFEITURE
gations and proceedings, resulting in substantial benefits to the
government.
IH. MECHANICS OF AN AuToMATIc STAY
A. Enactment
An automatic stay provision could be enacted in a number of
ways. First, Congress could amend title 18, section 981(g) and ti-
tle 21, section 881(i) to expand the statutory stay and implement
an automatic stay provision in its place.5" Although several civil
forfeiture reform bills have been introduced in Congress, few of
these proposals would amend the existing stay provisions.5 ' Sec-
ond, the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure or the Supplemental
Rules for Certain Admiralty and Maritime Proceedings ("Supple-
mental Rules"), which govern civil forfeiture proceedings, 5 5 could
be amended to provide for a stay. 6 Finally, and most impor-
tantly, district courts could enact an automatic stay provision for
civil forfeiture proceedings as part of their court's local rules.57
Such a rule could be grounded on a court's inherent discretion to
53 Significantly, Congress has provided that in actions involving the forfeiture of
imported immoral articles, "[u]pon motion of the United States, a court shall stay...
civil forfeiture proceedings ... pending the completion of any related criminal mat-
ter." 19 U.S.C. § 1305(d) (1988). This section is substantially broader than the provi-
sions of 18 U.S.C. § 981 and 21 U.S.C. § 881. However, this section still conditions
stays upon an application of the government, and still requires resolution of a motion.
In drafting an automatic stay provision, legislators can obtain guidance from the au-
tomatic stay provision of the Bankruptcy Code. See, e.g., 11 U.S.C. § 362(a) (1988)
(providing protective stay of broad range of acts against debtor, debtor's property, or
debtor's estate).
54 Several pending bills make no provision for staying forfeiture actions, see 1993
H.R. 2417, 3347, while the National Conference of Commissioners on Uniform State
Laws draft proposal relies on the "good cause" language of the present provisions, and
limits the stay to the period "during a criminal trial of a related indictment or infor-
mation." NCCUSL Draft, Amendments to Uniform Controlled Substances Act, Article
V, § 517(d).
55 FED. R. CIrv. P. Supp. Rule A. The Supplemental Rules for Certain Admiralty
and Maritime Claims apply to "the procedure in statutory condemnation proceedings
analogous to maritime actions in rem, whether within the admiralty and maritime
jurisdiction or not." Id.
56 See ABA Report 108B, supra note 31, at 8 (recommending amendment of Fed-
eral Rules of Civil Procedure to create "a rebuttable presumption in favor of a com-
plete stay of parallel civil proceedings").
57 District courts have broad power to enact local rules, as long as they are not
inconsistent with the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. 28 U.S.C. § 2071(a); FED. R.
Cirv. P. 83; Somlyo v. J. Lu-Rob Enter., 932 F.2d 1043, 1046 (2d Cir. 1991) (noting that
local rules have force of law); Holloway v. Lockhart, 813 F.2d 874, 880 (8th Cir. 1987);
Miranda v. Southern Pac. Transp. Co., 710 F.2d 516, 521 (9th Cir. 1983).
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stay proceedings.58 Amendment of local rules would permit those
courts most affected by the flood of civil forfeiture litigation to en-
act an automatic stay provision quickly and with relative ease.59
B. Procedure
In order to conserve judicial resources, a stay of civil forfei-
ture proceedings should be imposed automatically without the
need for a motion. Unlike the bankruptcy context in which the
filing of a petition triggers the automatic stay, however, 60 no sin-
gular event in forfeiture proceedings provides a definitive basis for
imposing a stay. While a stay could be triggered upon the filing of
an indictment or information, this procedure would not provide
the necessary safeguards during the pendency of criminal investi-
gations or grand jury proceedings. Additionally, under certain cir-
cumstances the parties may wish to proceed with civil forfeiture
actions, notwithstanding a pending investigation or prosecution. 1
Accordingly, an automatic stay could best be implemented by
the filing of a notice by any party to a civil forfeiture proceeding.
The notice would merely have to certify that the civil proceedings
should be stayed due to an ongoing investigation or prosecution
or, in the case of a claimant, due to a good faith belief that there is
a related investigation. The filing of such a notice would automat-
ically stay all proceedings in the action for a specific period of
time. Notices filed in federal civil proceedings are, of course, sub-
ject to Rule 11 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure,62 which
58 Of course, as noted above, in In re Ramu Corp., the Fifth Circuit held that this
inherent discretion was circumscribed by the statutory stay provisions. In re Ramu
Corp., 903 F.2d 312, 318-19 (5th Cir. 1990); see supra notes 23-31 and accompanying
text. However, a number of other courts have held that district courts retain the dis-
cretion to stay civil forfeiture proceedings. See, e.g., Statewide, 971 F.2d at 905; Afro-
Leron, Inc. v. United States, 820 F.2d 1198, 1202 (D.C. Cir. 1987); SEC v. Dresser
Indus., Inc., 628 F.2d 1368, 1375 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 449 U.S. 993 (1980); United
States v. 1344 Ridge Rd., 751 F. Supp. 1060, 1062 (E.D.N.Y. 1989).
59 For example, in 1992, the following districts had more than 300 civil forfeiture
cases pending: Central District of California (529), Southern District of Florida (449),
Southern District of California (387), and Eastern District of New York (317). See
Civil Caseload Statistics of Asset Forfeitures by District, Aug. 31, 1992.
60 See 11 U.S.C. § 362(a) (1988).
61 See Shaffer v. United States, 528 F.2d 920, 922 (4th Cir. 1975) (setting forth
procedure allowing parties to proceed in tax refund actions when taxpayer granted
use immunity).
62 FED. R. Crv. P. 11. Rule 11 provides that, by his signature on a pleading, mo-
tion, or other paper, an attorney certifies that: he has read the paper; to the best of his
knowledge, the paper is well grounded in fact and law; and that the pleading, motion,
or other paper is not interposed for any improper purpose. Id. A violation of the rule
[Vol. 67:705
CIVIL FORFEITURE
provides for sanctions in the case of an improper filing. The avail-
ability of an automatic stay would allow the government to protect
criminal investigations and prosecutions without disclosing sensi-
tive information, and would prevent claimants from facing a Hob-
son's choice presented by the negative inference in later proceed-
ings. Moreover, in cases in which all parties are willing to proceed
in spite of parallel criminal proceedings, the automatic stay need
not be imposed.63
C. Possession of the Defendant's Property During the Stay
As a general matter, forfeiture proceedings are commenced by
the seizure of property subject to a forfeiture action.64 Until re-
cently, the government had virtually unfettered discretion to seize
property on an exparte basis.65 However, during the past several
years, courts have cut back on the government's right to seize
property without notice pursuant to the Supplemental Rules. The
Supreme Court, for example, has held that the Due Process
Clause prohibits the government from seizing real property with-
out notice or an opportunity to be heard.66 In such cases, the gov-
ernment may commence the action and protect its interest by fil-
ing a complaint and a notice of pendency against the real
property.67 The Second Circuit has recently stated, in dicta, that
similar protections, notice and an opportunity to be heard, should
be extended to ongoing businesses. 6 The government retains the
allows the court, in its discretion, to impose sanctions, including striking the offensive
paper, and the payment of the adversary's expenses. Id.
63 In such a situation, the court may lose the benefit of the collateral estoppel
effect of completing criminal proceedings prior to resolving the forfeiture action. See
United States v. 89 Firearms, 465 U.S. 354, 362 (1984). Courts could, however, retain
the discretion to impose a stay sua sponte.
64 See 18 U.S.C. § 981(b)(2) (1988).
65 FED. R. Cry. P. Supp. Rule C(4) (requiring no notice other than execution of
process). It is settled that "[the rationale underlying [the] limited notice [of Supple-
mental Rule C(4)] is that 'seizure of [property] alone will result in prompt, actual
notice to all interested parties without the necessity of formal personal notice.'"
United States v. $51,680 in U.S. Currency, 1985 WL 2727 (N.D. IM. 1985) (quoting
The Mary, 13 U.S. (9 Cranch) 126 (1815)); accord Wong Shing v. M/V Mardina Trader,
564 F.2d 1183 (5th Cir. 1977) (upholding procedure of Supplemental Rule C(4)).
66 See, e.g., United States v. James Daniel Good Real Property, 114 S. Ct. 492,
500-01 (1993); United States v. 4492 South Livonia Rd., 889 F.2d 1258 (2d Cir. 1989).
67 James Daniel Good, 114 S. Ct. at 500-02; 4492 South Livonia Rd., 897 F.2d at
661.
68 United States v. Statewide Auto Parts, 971 F.2d 896, 901 (2d Cir. 1990) (con-
cluding that ex parte seizures "effectively shut[ ] down an ongoing business" and can
be avoided by utilizing other means).
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right to seize conveyances 69 and funds, 70 and retain such property
pendente lite in order to prevent waste or removal of property sub-
ject to forfeiture.
These rules can also govern possession of the defendant's
property during the pendency of the stay; for example, in the case
of funds or conveyances, the government would retain possession
of the property while the proceedings are stayed. In the case of
real property, the claimant would maintain possession of the prop-
erty during the stay, unless the government was willing to submit
to a hearing.7 '
D. Duration of a Stay
A stay, naturally, cannot be of indefinite duration.72 A
lengthy stay can impose a severe hardship on forfeiture claim-
ants,73 particularly when the government is in possession of the
claimant's property.74 Moreover, there are circumstances under
which an indefinite stay is impractical, such as where the criminal
defendant is a fugitive.76
69 See Calero-Toledo v. Pearson Yacht Leasing Co., 416 U.S. 663 (1974); State-
wide, 971 F.2d at 905.
70 See United States v. Daccarett, 6 F.3d 37, 49 (2d Cir. 1993) (upholding seizure
of wire transfers); United States v. $8850, 461 U.S. 555, 562 (1983) (upholding seizure
of money for failure to make proper declaration upon entering country).
71 In many cases, where there are pending criminal proceedings, the evidence
needed to conduct such a hearing could compromise an investigation or prosecution.
However, since the government's burden is only probable cause, which can be estab-
lished through hearsay, there may be cases in which the government may proceed
with a hearing without jeopardizing the criminal case. See, e.g., United States v.
Puello, 814 F. Supp. 1155 (E.D.N.Y. 1993). Moreover, an opportunity to be heard does
not necessarily require the government to submit to a hearing; the government's bur-
den can be met through the use of affidavits. Statewide, 971 F.2d at 905.
72 In re Ramu Corp., 903 F.2d 312, 318 (5th Cir. 1990) (holding that stay of forfei-
ture proceeding may not be of "indefinite duration"); United States v. Banco Cafetero,
107 F.R.D. 361, 366 (S.D.N.Y. 1985), affd, 797 F.2d 1154 (2d Cir. 1986).
73 See $8850, 461 U.S. at 565 ("Being deprived of this substantial sum of money
for a year and a half is undoubtedly a significant burden."); United States v. All Funds
on Deposit, 801 F. Supp. 984, 989 (E.D.N.Y. 1992) ("[Tlhe loss of use of the seized
funds for months or years while the case drags on can cripple a business."), affd sub
nom. Unites States v. Daccarett, 6 F.3d 37 (2d Cir. 1993).
74 The effect of deprivation of property during the pendency of the stay can be
mitigated in many cases by allowing the claimant to post a bond or other security to
regain possession of the property. See generally FED. R. Civ. P. Supp. Rule E(5) (pro-
viding for release of property upon posting bond).
75 See, e.g., United States v. Funds Held in the Name of John Hugh Wetterer, 138
F.R.D. 356, 361-62 (E.D.N.Y. 1991) (where defendant is fugitive "it can not be pre-
dicted when the civil forfeiture proceeding will continue if an indefinite stay is
granted").
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Therefore, an automatic stay should be of limited duration.
In light of the requirements of the Speedy Trial Act, 6 such a stay
could logically be limited to a six-month period, subject to renewal
at the end of the period. 7 Most criminal proceedings should be
completed during the six-month period.s If the proceedings are
not completed, the government or the claimant could apply for an
extension of the stay. For the reasons set forth above, courts
should grant such extensions liberally, subject only to the consid-
eration of the hardships imposed on the claimants.
CONCLUSION
By encompassing mandatory stay provisions in the civil for-
feiture statutes found in titles 18 and 21 of the United States
Code, Congress recognized the governmental interest in protec-
tion of criminal prosecutions from broad civil discovery. The need
for staying civil forfeiture actions pending the resolution of related
criminal proceedings has been heightened by several factors, in-
cluding increasing numbers of such actions, growing concern for
the rights of claimants, and broader application of constitutional
protections. Unfortunately, judicial interpretation of the extant
provisions has limited the discretion of courts in the imposition of
a stay and rendered the process unnecessarily burdensome.
Given the volume of civil forfeiture litigation and the ephemeral
nature of applicable law, the institution of an automatic stay pro-
vision would reduce the burden on courts while protecting the
rights of the government and claimants.
76 18 U.S.C. §§ 3161-3175 (1988).
77 See Funds in Name of Wetterer, 138 F.R.D. at 362.
78 See 18 U.S.C. §§ 3161-3175. The Speedy Trial Act requires the commencement
of a criminal trial within 60 days of arraignment or indictment. Id. § 3161(c).
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